Every May since 1999, China has unilaterally imposed its three-month ban on all foreign and domestic fishing vessels in the South China Sea (SCS). The state-sponsored Xinhua News explains that the strict guidelines are a “part of the country’s efforts to … improve marine ecology” in the region. Despite this seemingly altruistic goal, however, the fishing ban is mired in controversy. While appearing innocuous in light of rapidly depleting fishery resources, its underlying complexities concertedly advance China’s territorial interests in the region, threatening environmental and political stability.
The SCS has been a persistent conflagration of competing territorial claims set against the backdrop of broader geopolitical interests. Maritime laws under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) dictate that a country’s EEZ can only extend 200 nautical miles from its coastline. However, China’s highly assertive nine-dash line policy has laid a sweeping claim to over 90 percent of these three million square kilometers of ocean. Whether accurately or otherwise, China justifies these actions using documents such as early maps created by Chinese cartographers, which they contend illustrate that Chinese sailors were the first to navigate and control these waters over two millennia ago.
Similar to China, Vietnam has long considered the SCS its traditional fishing grounds, referencing historical evidence dating back to the 17th century to support its extended EEZ claims today. Relations between the two countries have rapidly deteriorated as a result. Meanwhile, the Philippines remains the only country whose EEZ claims comply with UNCLOS regulations, a fact which they have leveraged to push back against Chinese expansionism. In 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines against China, as the latter’s territorial claims extended almost 2,000 nautical miles from its shore. Despite being a signatory to UNCLOS, however, China refused to recognize the court’s authority, further highlighting the antagonistic nature of sovereignty disputes in the region.
There is no lack of speculation regarding China’s desire to expand its presence in the SCS, whether in the context of great power competition with the West, international economic activity and trade, or historical memory. Another crucial factor, however, is access to fisheries. Fish stocks provide essential resources to 77 percent of the nearly 190 million coastal residents across China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines, with consumption projected to increase by 30 percent in the coming decade. Simultaneously, the fishing industry remains crucial to the Chinese economy, generating over US$279 billion annually and employing 14 million people. Rising demand coupled with climate change and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing has led to the rapid deterioration of the marine ecosystem, with over half of all fisheries having collapsed or been over-exploited as of 2008.
The lack of a regulatory framework in the SCS for fish stocks has left China to fill the void. Articles 123 and 193 of UNCLOS require signatory countries to engage in cooperative dialogue on matters of marine sustainability. However, consensus on the issue remains sparse, and informal “gentlemen’s agreements” between countries have quickly collapsed. Therefore, in the absence of regional cooperation, China’s policy appears to offer a convenient top-down solution to manage fishery resources.
China claims its approach has been successful. Data from the government indicate that the ban has reversed the previously exponentially increasing annual catch rate, with the number of fishing vessels in the region also decreasing by 10 percent, from 220,000 to 198,000, over ten years. However, some question the validity of these claims as China has a consistent history of underreporting catches to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. Similarly, reductions in the fishing fleet could be considered insignificant toward total net yields, as the average size and engine power also increased accordingly during this time. Moreover, numerous reports of Vietnamese fishermen continuing to operate in Chinese waters even amidst the prohibition have raised questions about the Coast Guard’s (CCG) ability to patrol and enforce the ban in such a vast area. Had China implemented the ban through cooperative means instead of its current ultimatum, such obstacles could have been avoided.
China’s unilateral imposition of its conservation policies in international waters has also triggered considerable political backlash. The moratorium extends far beyond China’s lawful EEZ, encompassing the northernmost portion of the sea from Vietnam and the Philippines up to Taiwan, or 12 degrees latitude north. Vietnam, for instance, has condemned it as “a violation of [their] sovereignty,” while the Philippines and the United States also called on China to abide by international law. In defense of the Chinese government’s position, they have enacted similarly extensive bans domestically and in non-contested waters. Such equitable standards could suggest a genuine concern for the environment instead of mere power projection.
Whether intentional or otherwise, China’s obfuscation of political and environmental objectives has put its neighbors in a double bind, rendering potential protests fruitless. If Vietnam and the Philippines contest the ban, China can construct them as greedy, prioritizing their own self-interest over preserving the greater marine ecosystem. However, by acknowledging the ban, they recognize, even if implicitly, China’s right to enforce environmental policy in these highly disputed waters, essentially conceding their claim to sovereignty over those areas. This can thus be considered part of China’s broader “gray zone warfare” strategy, in which authoritarian states exploit holes in international law to advance their national agenda.
While highly strategic from the perspective of the Chinese government, these actions unnecessarily increase the risks of a clash with potentially disastrous security ramifications. There have already been hundreds of reports of harassment, arrests, and even kidnappings of Vietnamese fishermen by the CCG around the Paracel Islands. Further, the CCG has recently been granted legal authorization from China to tow or fire on foreign vessels violating the ban, in addition to being given several combat vessels previously assigned to the navy. China’s stance on fishing has therefore shifted to a newfound “unequivocally military character” that “facilitates … aggression.” Indeed, their neighbors have also responded accordingly. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently reaffirmed his country’s alliance with the Philippines, warning that an armed attack would trigger US mutual defense commitments. Rising tensions coupled with miscommunication give the situation the potential to escalate dangerously.
Overall, it is evident through China’s harsh and unilateral implementation that the fishing ban, while serving some environmental purposes, is also an instrument for Chinese power projection in the SCS. In an increasingly multipolar world, there is a greater need for not only international but regional frameworks that regulate and mediate conflict resolution. These are particularly important in areas like the SCS, where cascading environmental issues fuel geopolitical tensions. Moving forward, regional organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should seek to build consensus around and enforce international law, in addition to signing the long-negotiated Code of Conduct with China. These measures can be a starting point for the successful management of fishery resources and territorial disputes, thereby securing the peace and livelihoods of the hundreds of millions of coastal residents who live in this highly volatile region.